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Abstract: Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) currently represent the best candidate to be
adopted as the communication solution for the last mile connection in process control
and monitoring applications in industrial environments. Most of these applications have
stringent dependability (reliability and availability) requirements, as a system failure may
result in economic losses, put people in danger or lead to environmental damages. Among
the different type of faults that can lead to a system failure, permanent faults on network
devices have a major impact. They can hamper communications over long periods of time
and consequently disturb, or even disable, control algorithms. The lack of a structured
approach enabling the evaluation of permanent faults, prevents system designers to optimize
decisions that minimize these occurrences. In this work we propose a methodology based on
an automatic generation of a fault tree to evaluate the reliability and availability of Wireless
Sensor Networks, when permanent faults occur on network devices. The proposal supports
any topology, different levels of redundancy, network reconﬁgurations, criticality of devices
and arbitrary failure conditions. The proposed methodology is particularly suitable for the
design and validation of Wireless Sensor Networks when trying to optimize its reliability
and availability requirements.Sensors 2012, 12 807
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1. Introduction
Traditionally, applicationsinindustrialenvironmentsarebasedonwiredcommunicationsolutions[1].
However, recently, the industry has shown interest in moving part of the communication infrastructure
from a wired to a wireless environment, in order to reduce costs related with installation, maintenance
and scalability of the applications. In this context, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) actually represent
the best candidate to be adopted as the communication solution for the last mile connection in process
monitoring and control applications in industrial environments [2]. Among many advantages, the
absence of a wired infrastructure enables WSN to extract information in a simpler way than traditional
monitoring and instrumentation techniques [3].
Industrial applications have usually stringent dependability (reliability and availability) requirements,
since faults may lead to system failures which can result in economic losses, environmental damage or
hurting people [4,5]. In this context, we can classify faults as transient or permanent [6]. Transient
faults usually affect communication links between devices and are caused by noise or electromagnetic
interferences. Permanent faults affect network devices and have their origin in hardware malfunctions.
After a permanent fault a device is considered (permanently) failed, and to become operational again
a repair activity is necessary. In this paper we focus on permanent faults that affect network devices
leading to its failure (note: the failure modes of a failed element become the fault types for the elements
interacting with it [6]). Permanent faults have, typically, a major impact on the system operation [7].
Their immediate consequence is that communications with the affected device are no longer possible.
However, in worst case situations various network devices can become isolated, as when a network
device that acts as a router fails. As a result, the control algorithm is disturbed which may lead to a
system failure with serious consequences.
The use of a methodology to evaluate the dependability requirements of a WSN can anticipate
decisions regarding the topology, criticality of the devices, levels of redundancy and network robustness,
that can be used to take decisions during the system life-cycle, and particulary, on early planning and
design phases. For example, depending on the topology, alternative paths to the sink can be created
improving the overall reliability of the network. In the same way, if a sensitivity analysis is supported,
critical devices can be identiﬁed and decisions about different redundancy approaches can be taken.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a methodology to evaluate the reliability and
availability of Wireless Sensor Networks in industrial environments that are subject to permanent faults
on network devices. The approach is based on Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), which is a technique used
to obtain the probability of occurrence of an undesired state or event [8]. In the addressed case, the
undesired event is related to the failure of a speciﬁc device or group of devices. A device is considered
to be faulty if it suffers a permanent failure or if there is not any route to sink that includes the device.Sensors 2012, 12 808
The proposal addresses several aspects, being very ﬂexible and able to be easily adapted to different
kinds of scenarios. When compared with the available approaches, the main advantages are:
 Support of all possible topologies: line, star, cluster and mesh;
 Network failure conditions can be speciﬁed in a very ﬂexible way, ranging from a single device to
groups of devices;
 Failure and repair processes can be characterized using different types of time distribution
functions;
 Network devices can have redundant (internal) architectures;
 Topology reconﬁgurations due to device failures are considered (e.g., self-healing routing
protocols);
 Different types of dependability measures can be obtained from the same model (e.g., reliability,
availability, MTTF) as well as the criticality of the network devices (Birnbaum’s measure).
To complement the proposed approach we have also developed a software tool that automatically
evaluates the reliability and availability of a WSN. The tool automatically generates a fault tree with
the minimal set of events that leads to the network failure condition. After that, the fault tree is
translated into a language understandable by the SHARPE (Symbolic Hierarchical Automated Reliability
and Performance Evaluator) tool [9], which is used to compute the desired dependability measures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys some of the most relevant
research works on reliability and availability evaluation for Wireless Sensor Networks. In Section 3, we
give an overview about Wireless Sensor Networks with a special attention to wireless industrial networks
standards, such as WirelessHART and ISA 100.11a. Next, in the Section 4, is held a brief introduction
to Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and basic concepts used in the proposal. Section 5 describes the proposed
methodology for the reliability and availability evaluation of Wireless Sensor Networks. In Section 6
several scenarios are evaluated using network topologies commonly adopted in industrial applications.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and presents directions for future studies.
2. Related Works
The network reliability problem is a classical reliability analysis problem [10] that can be classiﬁed
as: k-terminal, 2-terminal or all-terminal. Suppose a network with N devices and a set of K devices
(K  N and jKj < jNj). K is a set composed by a sink node and jKj 1 ﬁeld devices. Deﬁning a sink
device s 2 K, the k-terminal problem is expressed as the probability that there is at least one path from
s to each ﬁeld device in K. The 2-terminal problem is the case where jKj = 2, whereas the all-terminal
problem is the case where jKj = jNj. These cases are known to be NP-hard problems, however several
algorithms can be found for networks with limited size [11].
The network reliability problem has been widely studied for wired networks. For example, in [12] the
author deals with the problem of measuring the reliability and availability of a wired network assuming
hardware and software failures. The author gives an important insight about the state-space enumeration
and the topology adaptation strategy when failures occur. The main difference between the reliability
analysis of wired and wireless networks is related to the dynamics of the network. In a wireless networks,
the dynamics of the network is greater since links fail more often and also due to the mobility of some ofSensors 2012, 12 809
the devices. An early work about the reliability evaluation for a radio-broadcast network was conducted
by [10]. In that work, the authors considered unreliable devices and reliable links and showed that the
two-terminal reliability problem for radio broadcast networks is computationally difﬁcult.
In [13], the authors analyzed the reliability and the expected maximum delay for a distributed sensor
network. The network is assumed to be dense and organized into clusters. The reliability was measured
as the probability that there was at least one path between the sink device and a sensor node within a
cluster. The authors assumed unreliable devices and reliable links. It was proved that the problem was,
in general, NP-hard. However for a topology up to 40 devices the problem is still tractable. In [14],
the network reliability was evaluated for mobile ad-hoc networks based on the 2-terminal problem.
The authors assumed unreliable devices and dynamic network connectivity. The proposed algorithm,
although not ﬁnding the minimal cut set for the network, can be extended for the type of static networks
typically found in industrial applications. In [15], the authors analyzed the inﬂuence of adding redundant
devices, in what concerns the reliability and availability of multi-hop wireless networks. This work
provides an interesting discussion about the reliability and availability of a WSN, particularly if it is
considered that a router node can be a redundant device.
A tentative effort to create a methodology to evaluate the reliability of a WSN infrastructure was
performed in [16]. The authors created a scheme based on reduced ordered binary decision diagrams
(ROBDD) to model a cluster topology, where a reliability evaluation was also conducted. The authors
do not considered multiple paths connecting a device to the sink. Thus, it is no longer possible to
use self-healing routing protocols. Common-cause failures were considered, but the technique was
focused in a single cluster. The methodology was applied only for a cluster topology with non-ﬂexible
failure conditions, and the criticality of devices was not determined. By introducing the concept
of coverage-oriented reliability, the same authors extended the previous work [16] creating other
mechanisms to evaluate the reliability of a WSN [17]. They assumed that the network fails if a speciﬁc
point in the cluster is not covered by at least K devices. This give a more ﬂexible way to conﬁgure failure
conditions. However it is not possible to create two or more coverage subsets for the same cluster.
Another coverage-oriented reliability mechanism was proposed in [18]. The authors propose a
framework to evaluate the reliability of a WSN based on coverage requirements. Given an area A,
the network fails if there is no subset of fully operating nodes whose own generated trafﬁc can reach the
sink and the total area covered by this subset is greater than A. The authors used a 3-state node reliability
model to represent random failures in the devices. This model has been shown to work better over the
conventional 2-state (operate/fail), but it neither supports the inclusion of spare devices nor indicates
the criticality of the devices. Finally, the inability to create several coverage areas makes it difﬁcult to
specify ﬂexible failure conditions.
Another methodology for the reliability evaluation of a WSN was proposed in [19]. The authors
propose a new topology control mechanism and they used a methodology for evaluating the reliability
of the network operating with this mechanism. The basic idea is to represent the network as a graph
and to measure the reliability based on the number of functional spanning trees. If there is at least one
functional spanning tree, then the network is considered reliable. The proposal is simple and works very
well for the analysis of the topology control mechanism. However it is not suitable to evaluate arbitrary
WSN. It is not possible to use and validate physical redundancy, neither to compute the criticality of theSensors 2012, 12 810
devices. Flexible failure conditions are also very difﬁcult to represent due the failure dependences for a
spanning tree condition.
As an alternative to the aforementioned approaches, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) techniques can be
used to evaluate the reliability and availability of the network. The main advantage of FTA is related
to the intuitive procedure used to describe events that lead to network failures. However, for complex
topologies the construction of the fault tree is a time-consuming task demanding much effort. The
usual solution is to adopt an approach that automatically generates the fault tree based on the network
speciﬁcation. In [20], the authors developed a modeling methodology for automatic generation of fault
trees. The idea is to split a system in different components that are represented by function tables and
state transition tables. These components are connected to each other in order to describe the behavior
of the whole system. After the modeling phase, a trace-back algorithm is used to create the fault tree.
In [21], an automatic generation mechanism for the fault tree was described within the context of an
automation system. The basic idea is to model the system using a timed automata and then perform
a model checking to verify which situations may lead to a system failure. After that, the results are
summarized and the fault tree is generated. Another way to automatically generate the fault tree is to use
digraphs (directed graphs) [22]. A digraph is composed by nodes and edges. Nodes represent component
failure whereas edges represent relationships between nodes. In [23], the authors developed an automatic
generator for fault tree based on digraphs. This work was an improvement upon the algorithm previously
proposed in [22]. In both approaches they create a digraph to model the behavior of the system. All
aforementioned works use dependency relations between system components to generate a fault tree.
Recently, an interesting contribution to the dependability evaluation of Wireless Sensor Networks was
proposed in [24,25]. The main idea is to compute a new dependability parameter called producibility,
that measures the probability of a sensor node is in a active state and it is able to communicate with
the sink at time t. This new measure combines the reliability of a sensor node with their battery level.
Network failure conditions are related with the existence of a minimum number of sensor nodes (k-out-n)
able to send data to the sink. Metrics are computed using analytic techniques based on Continuous
Time Markov Chains (CTMC) and reward functions. In [26] the same authors propose an alternative
approach based on Non-Markovian Stochastic Petri Nets (NMSPN). This numerical based approach
was selected to relax some of the assumptions related to the analytical technique. In the same work,
they also propose to use Fault Trees to compute the network failure condition. Although these are
interesting works, they are too much focused on energy consumption problems, which makes it difﬁcult
to extend the proposed methodology for generic scenarios. The same applies for the metrics. Moreover,
network failure conditions are deﬁned in a very restrictive way (k-out-n devices) which are not suitable
for industrial scenarios, where it is important to identify the failed device and not only the number of
failed devices.
It becomes clear from the previous discussion that these works only provide partial solutions for the
problem. Since most of them are focused on speciﬁc scenarios, they are very restrictive with regard
to the deﬁnition of network failure conditions, dependability metrics, topology, network reconﬁguration
and redundancy aspects, as well as applicability to industrial scenarios. The present work aims to remove
most of these limitations by proposing a methodology that considers the most important aspects of the
network operation through a ﬂexible approach.Sensors 2012, 12 811
3. Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless Sensor Networks are a pervasive technology that targets the connectivity between sensor
nodes in multiple environments. Its infrastructure is usually composed of a large number of sensor nodes,
with small physical size, which runs upon relatively inexpensive computational processes. Sensor nodes
measure local environmental conditions and forward sensed values to a set of central points, referred
as sink nodes, for appropriate processing. Sensor nodes can sense the environment, communicate with
neighbor nodes, and perform basic computations on collected data. Installation ﬂexibility and easy
conﬁguration enable better usability and maintenance than traditional communication technologies [1].
These characteristics allow the use of WSN over a wide range of useful applications [3,27–29].
Currently, WSN solutions are based on standardized or proprietary protocols. There are many
different protocols for the upper layers, but the IEEE 802.15.4 [30] is a de facto standard for the lower
layers. Recently the IEEE 802.15.5 standard [31] has been released to provide multi-hop mesh functions.
Both standards are compatible while maintaining simplicity. On the other hand, Zigbee (2004) and
Zigbee Pro (2007) were the ﬁrst standards to implement the upper layers. Both standards do not have the
support for channel hopping and are still not scalable enough to support large topologies [32]. Channel
hopping is an important feature when industrial applications are considered, due to its robustness against
external interferences and persistent multi-path fading. A new standard, IEEE 802.15.4e, is being
developed to support additional industrial requirements and it is expected to be approved by the end
of 2011. Currently, only the WirelessHART and ISA 100.11a standards are suitable to be used in
industrial applications.
The methodology proposed in this paper can be easily implemented to evaluate the reliability and
availability of Zigbee, WirelessHART and ISA 100.11a networks. However, as the application focus is
for industrial environments, only the WirelessHart and ISA 100.11a standards will be described in the
following sections.
3.1. WirelessHART
WirelessHART is an extension of the HART protocol to support wireless communication. The
concept behind WirelessHART was ﬁrst discussed in 2004 at the HART Communication Foundation
(HCF) meeting. The main question was how to interoperate legacy devices with wireless devices, in
ordertotakeadvantageoftheamountofinstalledHARTdevices.Itisestimatedthatmorethan24million
HART devices are installed around the world and its shipping expected are around over 2 million per
year [33]. In September 2008, the WirelessHART speciﬁcation (HART 7.1) was approved by the
International Electrotechnical Comission (IEC) as a publicly available speciﬁcation (IEC 62591) [34].
WirelessHART was the ﬁrst industrial wireless communication technology to attain this level of
international recognition [35].
WirelessHART deﬁnes eight types of devices, as presented in Figure 1: network manager, network
security, gateway, access point, ﬁeld device, adapter, router and handheld device. All devices that
are connected to the wireless network implement basic mechanisms to support network formation,
maintenance, routing, security and reliability.Sensors 2012, 12 812
Figure 1. WirelessHART devices.
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Field devices are the most basic WirelessHART devices. They are directly connected to the process
and plant equipments. Field devices can transmit measurement data, receive and forward packets from/to
any device. Usually they may be line, loop or battery powered. All ﬁeld devices have a physical
maintenance port, which is used for ofﬂine conﬁguration and diagnostics. Compatibility with legacy
HART devices is guaranteed through the use of adapter devices. The adapter devices are not directly
connected to the plant equipments, however, they have to support the same functionalities of ﬁeld
devices. On the other hand, handheld devices are used during the installation, conﬁguration and
maintenance phases of the network. They do not have to support routing mechanisms.
Router devices are used for routing purposes, i.e., forward packets from one device to another device.
They are not directly connected to the industrial process, thus they can be installed anywhere in the plant.
Their use is not really necessary since ﬁeld devices have internal routing capabilities. However, router
devices can provide redundant paths to the gateway, and they can also minimize energy consumption in
ﬁelddevices. Theconnectionbetweentheplantautomationnetworkandthewirelessnetworkisprovided
by the gateway. The gateway works as a sink point for all wireless trafﬁc. The logical communication
with the wireless network occurs through access points installed in the gateway. The amount of access
points can be conﬁgured to increase redundancy and to improve the effective network throughput.
The security manager is the entity responsible for ensuring the security over the network. It provides
join, network and session keys for all devices. These keys are used to authenticate and to encrypt
data. The storage and management of keys is also under the responsibility of the security manager.
The core of the WirelessHART is the network manager. It is logically connected to the gateway and
manages the entire network. The communication with network devices occurs through the application
layer protocol. The main duties of the network manager are related with scheduling, management ofSensors 2012, 12 813
the device list, routing (redundant paths), collect information about performance, failure detection, and
network formation.
WirelessHART has a physical layer based on IEEE 802.15.4, but implements its own medium
access control (MAC) sublayer. The MAC is based on a TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access)
communication mechanism that uses superframes. Superframes are composed by slots, and the amount
of slots indicates its periodicity. To support multiple schedule requirements, a WirelessHART network
can use multiple superframes with different number of slots. Each slot has a ﬁxed duration of 10 ms,
which is enough time to transmit a packet and receive an acknowledgment (the maximum packet size
is 133 bytes including headers). Slots can be dedicated or shared. The use of dedicated slots is more
common. Shared slots are used for transmission retries and advertising indication during the join
procedure. A slot supports until 15 channels, thus, theoretically 15 devices can simultaneously transmit
in the same slot time. The standard uses a mechanism of frequency hopping and a channel blacklist to
minimize the inﬂuence of noise/interference in the network operation and consequently to increase the
communication reliability.
An important procedure deﬁned in the WirelessHART is the path failure indication [36]. The
communication between two devices can fail due to hardware failures or due to interferences from the
external environment. Therefore, it is essential that failure events are reported to the application. The
WirelessHART deﬁnes the variable path-fail-time to control the path failure indication. If a device
identiﬁes that no packet was received from a speciﬁc neighbor within the path-fail-time, an alarm
indicating that the path is no longer available is sent to the application.
3.2. ISA 100.11a
The International Society of Automation (ISA) has developed a wireless mesh networking standard
known as ISA 100.11a [37] that guarantees a deterministic communication latency, while increasing
the communication reliability. It focuses on process control and monitoring applications, with latency
requirements around 100 ms. ISA 100.11a can coexists with other wireless technologies such as cell
phones, IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15, IEEE 802.16, and can provide tunneling for legacy protocols
(HART, Foundation Fieldbus, Proﬁbus, Modbus).
A typical ISA 100.11a network is presented in Figure 2. It may be composed of seven types of
devices: gateway, system manager, security manager, router, backbone router, input/output (IO) devices
and portable devices. Each device has a speciﬁc role deﬁnition that control its functions. The IO device
is responsible for monitoring the environment. If minimization of the energy consumption is conﬁgured,
the IO device only transmits messages. Otherwise, the IO device can also route messages. In addition to
the routing functionality, a router device shares the function of provisioning devices to join the network.
A router device can use slow slotted hopping to send advertising messages about the network for joining
devices. On the other hand, backbone router devices are used to encapsulate external networks in order
to carry native protocols over ISA 100.11a. The gateway device provides a connection between the
wireless sensor network and the plant automation network. There is support for multiple gateways and
backbone routers [38]. The most important tasks are performed by the security manager and the system
manager. The system security management function is controlled by the security manager whereas the
system manager governs all the network, devices and communications.Sensors 2012, 12 814
Figure 2. Typical ISA 100.11a network.
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Similarly to WirelessHART, ISA 100.11a has a physical layer based on IEEE 802.15.4. On the other
hand, the data link layer is slightly different from the one used on WirelessHART. The slot time has
duration of 10 ms or 12 ms. The schedule mechanism was designed in a more ﬂexible way than the
WirelessHART schedule. There is support for slotted channel hopping (TDMA), slow channel hopping
(CSMA) and a hybrid combinations of both. The TDMA approach is similar to the WirelessHART
schedule. In the CSMA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access) approach, contiguous slot times are grouped
into a single radio channel with a period ranging from 100 ms to 400 ms. During this period the radio
of devices are always activated. This approach is indicated for neighborhood discovery procedures
and frequency hopping in the case of overlapping with 802.11 networks, for example. On the
other hand, the hybrid approach is more suitable for a ﬂexible retry procedure. Other improvements
when compared with the WirelessHART standard are related with the frequency hopping pattern.
ISA 100.11a has deﬁned ﬁve default hopping patterns to mitigate the inﬂuence of external
communication interference. For example, the pattern 1 is conﬁgured to eliminate the overlap with
the same channels of IEEE 802.11.
The network and transport layers support mesh networks, similarly to WirelessHART. However,
addressing in ISA 100.11a is compatible with the 6LoWPAN [39] (IPv6 over IEEE 802.15.4).
ISA 100.11a also introduces a new mechanism to detect failures in the network based on the transmission
of alert messages.
4. Reliability, Availability and Fault Tree Analysis
In this section, we provide a brief introduction to reliability, availability and fault tree analysis
concepts that are closely related with the proposed methodology.
4.1. Reliability
Reliability is a measure used to characterize if a component/system, is properly working according to
its speciﬁcations during a speciﬁc period of the time [6]. Formally, it is deﬁned as the probability that aSensors 2012, 12 815
component does not fail in the time interval (0;t]. Considering that the time to failure of a component,
T, is a random variable deﬁned by a cumulative distribution function F(t) (CDF), the reliability R(t) is
given by:
R(t) = Pr(T > t) = 1   F(t) (1)
The reliability function is closely related with the failure rate function (t). This function (also
known as hazard rate) describes the instantaneous failure rate of a component. Formally, this function
is deﬁned as the probability that a component fails during the period of the time [x;x + t], knowing
that it is working at time instant t = x. The behavior of this function has been extensively discussed in
the literature [40]. For many systems/components this function presents a characteristic shape which is
similar to a bathtub curve. When the system is young, the failure rate is higher (infant mortality), and
thenquicklydecreasesuntilstabilizes(usefullife). Asthesystem/componentgetsolderitincreasesagain
(wear out). For electrical/electronic systems it is common to consider that the failure rate is constant
during the useful life period, i.e., (t) =  [41]. It can be proved that R(t) and (t) are related according
to the following expression [42]
R(t) = exp

 
Z t
0
(u)du

(2)
Therefore (t) establishes R(t). Another metric related with R(t) is the MTTF (Mean Time to
Failure). Formally, it is deﬁned as the expected (average) time during which a component is working
properly, and is given by [42]
MTTF = E(T) =
Z 1
0
tf(t)dt (3)
4.2. Availability
Availability is a measure which is deﬁned as the probability of a component/system is functioning at
time t. The availability at the instant t is referred as instantaneous availability A(t). The steady-state
availability expresses the percentage of time that a component is working properly. Formally it is deﬁned
as A = limt!1 A(t) (note: this metric only makes sense in systems which have a stationary probabilistic
condition [42]). Availability is closely related with repair actions. In fact, it is implied that the system is
repaired after a failure, otherwise limt!1 A(t) = 0. For a non-repairable system A(t) = R(t).
Similarity to the failure rate (t), it is possible to deﬁne a repair rate (t), as the rate at which a failed
component is repaired. The MTTR (Mean Time to Repair) is deﬁned as the expected (average) time that
takes to repair a component. If failure and repair rates are assumed constant, respectively  and , then
it can be proved that A(t) is given by [42]
A(t) =

 + 
+

 + 
e
 (+)t (4)
Finally, if failure and repair actions are independent and described by i:i:d (independent and
identically distributed) random variables, than the following relationship applies [42]
lim
t!1
A(t) = A =
MTTF
MTTF + MTTR
(5)
This expression is independent of the CDF that characterize failure and repair processes.Sensors 2012, 12 816
4.3. Fault Tree Analysis
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a deductive technique commonly used to evaluate system’s
dependability [43]. It can be used to describe the root causes that lead to a system failure, in a qualitative
or quantitative way. In the former case, it can be used during system development to identify potential
problems that could lead to a system failure, or after commissioning, to identify events that caused a
system failure. In the latter case, it is mainly used to obtain dependability measures, such as the system’s
reliability and availability.
Fault trees (FT) are a graphical model that represents the combination of events that lead to a system
failure. The model uses a treelike structure composed by events and logic gates. Events represent
either normal or faulty conditions, such as component failures, environmental conditions, human-made
faults, etc. They are considered boolean, i.e., they either occur or not occur. Logic gates are used
to represent the cause-effect relationships among events. The inputs of these gates are either single
events or combinations of events which result from the output of other gates. There are several types of
gates available, such as and, or and k-out-of-n (Figure 3). The process of building a FT is performed
deductively and starts by deﬁning the TOP event, which represents the system failure condition. From
this event, and by proceeding backwards, the possible root causes are identiﬁed. The events at the bottom
of the tree are referred as basic events. If a basic event occurs two or more times in a FT it is called a
repeated event.
Figure 3. Cumulative distribution function (Ffc(t)) for the gate output (and, or, k-out-of-n).
or and k-out
of-n
Fi(t) Fn(t) . . .
Ffc(t) = 1 − Πn
i=1(1 − Fi(t))
Fi(t) Fn(t) . . .
Ffc(t) = Πn
i=1Fi(t)
Fi(t) Fn(t) . . .
Ffc(t) =
P
|I|≥k
(Πi∈IFi(t))(Πi ∈I(1 − Fi(t)))
From a probabilistic point of view, the assessment of a FT consists of calculating the probability of
the TOP event starting from the probabilities of the basic events. This calculation is performed differently
for each type of gate. Assuming a gate with n independent inputs (events), where the occurrence of event
i is described by means of a cumulative distribution function Fi(t) , then the gate output CDF Ffc(t) is
given according to the Figure 3 [42].
When an and gate is used, the failure condition occurs only if all input events have occurred. On the
other hand, when an or gate is used, the failure condition occurs if at least one input event have occurred.
Finally, if a k-out-of-n gate is used, the failure condition occurs if at least k input events have occurred.
When a FT does not contain any repeated event, the probability of the TOP event can be obtained
through direct calculation using the formulas presented in Figure 3. However, if there are repeated
events these equations are no longer valid. Therefore, in these situations it is necessary to employ
different approaches. In the literature we can ﬁnd several techniques to accomplish this task, such
as inclusion-exclusion principle, sum of disjoint products, factorization and direct/indirect recursive
methods [43]. In the context of this work, we will focus on the sum of disjoint products (SDP) [44].Sensors 2012, 12 817
The SDP method can be efﬁciently employed in fault trees with repeated events and it is easily
automated. The basic idea of SDP is to ﬁnd a boolean function (x) that describes the failure condition
(i.e., the TOP event), and to transform this function into another function where the individual terms are
mutually exclusive.
Consider a system with n components. The ﬁrst step starts by obtaining the structure function of the
system, (x), which is given by
(x) =
(
1 if the system has failed
0 if the system has not failed
(6)
where x is referred as the state vector, x = (x1;x2;:::;xn). Each element xi is a boolean variable that
represents the state of component i (e.g., i = 1 , the component has failed). The function (x) can
also be expressed as the union of minimal cut sets.
(x) = K1 [ K2 [  [ Kn (7)
A cut set Ki is a subset of events whose simultaneous occurrence leads to the occurrence of the TOP
event. A cut set is said to be minimal if does not contain other cut set. There are several algorithms
available to automate the process of obtaining the minimal cut sets from a fault tree [43]. After obtaining
the cut sets, (x) can be transformed in a sum of disjoint products, as follows
(x) = K1 [ K2 [  [ Kn = K1 [ K1K2 [  [ K1 :::Kn 1Kn (8)
where Ki the i-cutset and Ki its complement. Since the terms are pairwise disjoint, the probability of
the TOP event can be obtained as the sum of the probabilities of the individual terms.
It is possible to compute several dependability measures from a fault tree. In the context of this work
we will focus on reliability and availability. Assume that the TOP event represents the failure of the
system. Thus, the probability of this event occurring during a period of time t is the complement of the
reliability R(t). If the TOP event is expressed by its minimal cut sets, then to compute the reliability is
onlynecessarytoreplaceeacheventi, intherespectivecutset, byitsreliabilityfunctionRi(t). Afterthat,
the reliability of the system R(t) can be easily computed using simple probability laws (i.e., probability
of union and intersection of events).
Availability can be obtained in a similar way, by replacing each event by the availability function
of each component Ai(t). However, this computation in only valid if the repair processes are all
independent and if the number of repairman (i.e., number of repair actions) is not limited. Further
details can be found in [43].
4.4. Component Importance
After computing the TOP event probability (or any other relevant metric, such as the reliability or
availability), the user is able to foresee the system behavior from a dependability viewpoint. However,
this does not highlight what is the contribution of each component to the ﬁnal result. Such information is
relevant because it allows the system designer to make decisions concerning the system structure, which
can be used to optimize dependability metrics (e.g., availability), or other performance measures.Sensors 2012, 12 818
In this section we will review some importance measures that can be used to rank components in order
of importance. We assume a system composed of n independent components, where each component i
is characterized by a reliability function Ri(t).
4.4.1. Birnbaum’s Measure
Birnbaum’s measure IB(ijt) is a metric that describes the reliability importance of a component [45].
This measure is deﬁned as the partial differentiation of the system reliability with respect to the reliability
of component i, as follows
I
B(ijt) =
@R(t)
@Ri(t)
for i = 1;2;:::;n (9)
If IB(ijt) is large, a small variation in the reliability of component i will result in a major change in
the reliability of the system. A component i is considered critical for the system, if when the component
i fails, the system also fails. Thus, the Birnbaum’s measure can also be interpreted as the probability of
component i being critical for the system at time t [42].
4.4.2. Criticality Importance
The criticality importance ICR(ijt) is a measure particularly suitable for prioritizing maintenance
actions [42]. This measure is deﬁned as the probability that component i is critical at time t and is failed
at time t, knowing that the system is failed at time t, being deﬁned as follows
I
CR(ijt) =
IB(ijt)(1   Ri(t))
1   R(t)
(10)
In other words, the criticality importance is the probability that a component i has caused a system
failure, knowing that system is failed at time t.
5. Methodology for Reliability and Availability Evaluation
The main objective of the proposed methodology is to provide a framework to support the evaluation
of the dependability of a WSN, in order to provide valuable information to the system designer enabling
it to develop robust and fault tolerant applications. The methodology can be applied on all stages of the
network life cycle, allowing the identiﬁcation of weaknesses (e.g., topology, devices, etc.) as well as
helping to deﬁne a strategy to cope with these problems.
5.1. Introduction
As aforementioned in the Section 2, the reliability evaluation of a general network is a NP-hard
problem. Nevertheless, as it will be discussed in the next section, this problem can be tractable for a
low-medium number of ﬁeld devices, as is the case of networks typically found in industrial applications.
Figure 4 overviews the proposed methodology. The process starts by providing information about
the network topology, device types and redundancy, device’s failure and repair process and network
failure condition. The latter one is deﬁned by a logical expression that combines the failure status of
ﬁeld devices. For attaining ﬂexible failure conditions and to support self-healing routing protocols, itSensors 2012, 12 819
is necessary to ﬁnd all paths between the gateway (sink) and the devices that encompass the failure
condition. Next, a fault tree is generated using all the previous data. From that, the respective minimal
cut sets are obtained using an inversion technique. This cut set is re-expressed as a (minimal) fault tree,
which is used to produce input data for the tool that computes the results. For this task we use the
SHARPE tool [9], which is able to compute the metrics of interest, either symbolically or numerically.
It is possible to evaluate the reliability, availability and mean time to failure (MTTF) of the WSN, and
also the Birnbaum’s and the criticality measures for all ﬁeld devices. Finally, we also have developed a
software tool that automates the previous steps.
Figure 4. Overview of the methodology for reliability and availability evaluation.
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5.2. Assumptions
The main assumptions considered in the methodology are the following:
 Topology: the network is composed of N ﬁeld devices, which can belong to one of the following
types: end device (e.g., sensor/actuator node), router, access point and gateway (i.e., sink). Devices
are arranged according to one of the following topologies: line, star, cluster and mesh. These
elements are deﬁned according to the WirelessHART, ISA 100.11a and Zigbee standards;
 Faults: onlypermanentfaultsareconsidered. Thelinks, duetoitswirelessnature, areonlyaffected
by transient faults and thus are considered to be reliable (i.e., they do not fail). Thus, only ﬁeld
devices can fail. After a permanent fault a device is considered failed (permanently). We assume
that device failures are independent. In principle any type of distribution can be used to characterize
the occurrence of device failures. However, the SHARPE tool poses some restrictions. The tool
imposes that CDFs must be expressed using exponential polynomial terms as following
F(t) =
n X
j=1
ajt
kje
bjt (11)
Many distributions can be expressed in this way (e.g., exponential, Erlang, hypoexponential,
hyperexponential). Other distributions (e.g., Weibull, deterministic) can be approximated using
exponential polynomial terms. Further details can be found in [46].
 Repairs: ﬁeld devices can be repaired after failing, if necessary. After a repair the device is
considered as new. We consider that repair processes are independent and that the number of
repairman (i.e., number of repair actions) is not limited. The time necessary to repair a device is
characterized by a repair distribution. This distribution is deﬁned in analogous way to the failure
distribution discussed previously;Sensors 2012, 12 820
 Redundancy: ﬁeld devices can have an internal redundant architecture with several available
spares. We assumethatwhen the mainelementfails, itsreplacementbya spareisalways performed
with success;
 Reconﬁguration: when a device fails the network topology can change. We assume that the
network manager (WirelessHART) or system manager (ISA 100.11a) is able to identify with
success a device failure, and then update the network topology (communication paths). It is also
assumedthatthetimerequiredtoperformthisoperationisnegligibleandthatitisalwayssuccessful
(if alternative paths exist). Thus, the support of self-healing routing protocols is assured, since all
paths between a ﬁeld device and the gateway are considered;
 Measures: the following measures can be computed: reliability, unreliability, availability,
unavailability, MTTF and component importance (Birnbaum and Criticality). Results can be
presented both numerically and symbolically using exponential polynomial terms.
 Inputs: to compute the measures it is necessary to provide the following input data: network
topology, type of devices, device’s redundancy, network failure condition, characteristics of the
device’s failure and repair processes and measures to compute.
5.3. Topology
The ﬁrst step of the proposed methodology is to deﬁne a structure through which the network can
be modeled. In the proposed approach, the network is organized as a graph G(V;E) with n vertices
(V ) and k edges (E). The vertices represent ﬁeld devices whereas the edges represent the wireless links
between devices. The network topology can be stored in the adjacency matrix (Ann) of graph G. If a
device Ni has a neighbor Nj, then the entries aij and aji of A will receive the value 1, otherwise they will
receive the value 0. Thus, by using this structure we can represent any WSN topology. Figure 5 shows
an example of a WSN represented using the aforementioned structure. In this example, the network is
composed by 1 gateway (Gtw0), 1 access point (Ap0), 2 routers (R0 and R1) and 3 ﬁeld devices (Fd0,
Fd1 and Fd2). The indexes located more close to the vertices are used to identify the devices in the
adjacency matrix.
Figure 5. Example of a Wireless Sensor Network represented through a graph and its
respective adjacency matrix.
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5.4. Network Failure Condition
The network failure condition deﬁnes which combination of devices may lead to a network failure. In
the proposed methodology we support any combination that can be expressed using boolean operators
(i.e., AND, OR). The failure condition associated to ﬁeld device Ni is deﬁned as fc Fdi. The case where
the device failure condition is related with several failure events will be described in the next sections. A
combination of devices that lead to a network failure is deﬁned as nfc andj, where j is the identiﬁcation
of combination and is represented by the boolean AND of the failure condition of the devices (note: if
the AND gate has only one input, the event nfc andj is replaced by the respective input). A device
can belong to more than one failure condition. The network failure condition (nfc) is represented by the
boolean OR of all combinations that lead to the network failure (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Network failure condition (nfc).
... ...
or
and and
or nfc
nfc and0 nfc andn
nfc
fc Fdi fc Fdk
. . . . . .
5.5. Device Redundancy
Regarding to redundancy issues, we consider that there are two types of ﬁeld devices: with
redundancy and without redundancy. The latter are simple ﬁeld devices, while the former are composed
by multiple devices arranged according to a fault-tolerant architecture based on a hot standby sparing
approach. Hot standby sparing provides redundancy through the use of spare devices. A device is kept
operational whereas the others devices (spares) are in standby. When the operational device fails, a spare
module assumes the operation. We assume that this is an internal arrangement of the ﬁeld device. That
is, from the perspective of an external observer the behavior of a redundant device is indistinguishable
from a device without redundancy. The number of spare devices available for each ﬁeld device is an
input of the model.
In the proposed model, devices are represented based on the failure event. The failure event for a
redundant device is represented by the boolean AND of all spare devices whereas a device without
redundancy is represented by a basic failure event.
5.6. Device Failure
After obtaining an expression for the network failure condition, it is necessary to deﬁne the conditions
that may lead to the failure of a ﬁeld device. Note that only devices that belong to the network failureSensors 2012, 12 822
condition are analyzed. We consider two possibilities for a device failure: (i) its hardware has failed; (ii)
there isno path betweenthe deviceand the gateway. This latter case corresponds toa connectivity failure,
since the device itself did not failed in a strict sense (i.e., it works), but it is considered non-operational
from a network perspective because it is no longer possible to communicate with it. If a device along
the path fails, the network may have the required mechanisms to reconﬁgure itself in order to use other
paths. This type of reconﬁguration is done by self-healing routing protocols. As aforementioned, the
failure condition for a ﬁeld device, fc Fdi, is split in two involving hardware and connectivity problems.
Regardingtohardwarefailures, wemustconsiderthecaseswheretheﬁelddevicesareconﬁguredwith
or without redundancy. A redundant device fails (Figure 7(a)) if the current operating device suffers
an hardware failure (Fdi a) and if all its spares have already failed (events Fdi b to Fdi z). This is
represented by event r Fdi. On the other hand, for a device without redundancy (Figure 7(b)) the device
fails when its hardware fails.
Figure 7. Device failure condition. (a) Redundant ﬁeld device; (b) Simple ﬁeld device;
(c) Connectivity problem.
fc Fdi
or
cp
and
Fdi a Fdi z
. . .
r Fdi
(a)
fc Fdi
or
cp Fdi a
(b)
... ...
or
and and
cp Fdi or
cp Fdi and0 cp Fdi andn
cp
APi, Ri, r Fdi, Fdi a
. . . . . .
(c)
Regarding failures related with the connectivity problem (represented by the event cp in Figure 7(a,b),
a device is considered to be faulty if there is no path from the device to the gateway (i.e., sink). In other
words, if a device has j paths connecting it to the gateway, at least one path must be working properly
to consider that the device is operational. The event cp that represents this situation (Figure 7(c)) results
from the combination of failures in access points (APi), routers (Ri), redundant devices (r Fdi) and
devices without redundancy (Fdi a).
We will use an example to clarify the notation described in Figure 7. Consider a WSN composed
by 4 ﬁeld devices: Fd1, Fd2, Fd3 and Fd4. The addressed problem is to ﬁnd the failure condition
associated to device Fd2. Assume that device Fd2 is redundant and has one spare device, while devices
Fd1, Fd3, and Fd4 are not redundant. Regarding to the connectivity problem, if device Fd3 fails or if
devices Fd1 and Fd4 fail, then device Fd2 will also fail since there is no path to the gateway. Based on
this scenario, the failure condition for device Fd2 (fc Fd2) is presented by Figure 8. Note that the event
cp Fd2 and0 was replaced by a single event Fd3 a because it makes no sense to build an AND gate with
just one input.Sensors 2012, 12 823
Figure 8. Example of a failure condition deﬁned for the ﬁeld device Fd2.
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm to generate all paths between a device and the gateway.
Algorithm: DFS(Paths, Device, Current Path)
Output: All paths between a ﬁeld device and the gateway.
1 for i   0; i < Number of Devices; i ++ do
// If the device is the gateway then a path was found
2 if Device == Gateway then
3 Paths.add(Current Path);
4 break;
// Do not search for paths in the neighborhood of access points
5 if Device == Access Point and i 6= Gateway then
6 break;
// Searching for neighbor devices
7 if adjMatrix [Device][i] == 1 then
// Eliminate cycles
8 if Current Path.indexOf(i) < 0 then
9 Current Path.add(i);
10 DFS(Paths,i,Current Path);
11 Current Path.remove;
Note that to ﬁnd all combinations that lead to a connectivity failure necessarily requires some effort.
To attain this, it is necessary to search all paths between the gateway and ﬁeld devices that belong to
the network failure condition. This procedure is described in Algorithm 1. The basic idea is to perform
a depth-ﬁrst search (DFS) in the adjacency matrix that represent the WSN. The procedure recursively
traverse all devices on the path until the gateway is reached. Two restrictions were introduced to simplify
the DFS. First, it makes no sense to search neighbor devices of the access point (line 5). Access pointsSensors 2012, 12 824
are directly connected to the gateway, and an access point does not communicate with another access
point. The second restriction is related to the elimination of paths within a cycle. During the recursion,
a device only joins to the current path if it is not already part of that path (line 8).
For the sake of understanding Algorithm 1, considers the example of the output ﬂow produced when
the paths from device Fd0 to the gateway are being searched for the scenario presented in Figure 5. The
output ﬂow for this example is shown in Figure 9 (note: only two paths are described (dark gray circles)
due to lack of space, however the others paths can be easily deduced.). The output ﬂow starts at device
Fd0 and explores as far as possible each branch (neighbor) until reaching the gateway. After that, a
backtracking procedure is conducted and another branch will be evaluated. Figure 9 is composed by 5
levels. The ﬁrst level is composed only by the target device (Fd0). The second level is composed by the
neighbors of device Fd0 (R0 and Fd1). The other levels follow the same procedure taking into account
the restrictions imposed by Algorithm 1 (lines 5 and 8).
Figure 9. Output ﬂow of Algorithm 1 for the device Fd0 of Figure 5.
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All paths generated by Algorithm 1 are stored in a data structure based on a fault tree. This data
structure will be used to generate the minimum cut sets in the next section. Each path i belonging to
device j is mapped for an and gate. The inputs of each and gate are composed by the devices of the
respective path. An or gate is used to connect all the paths (and gates) from a device to the gateway.
5.7. Minimal Cut Set Generation
After deﬁning both the network failure condition and ﬁnding all the paths between the gateway and
ﬁeld devices that belong to the network failure condition, it becomes possible to generate a fault tree
describing the network failure process. In this faulty tree, the TOP event represents the network failure
condition and the basic events represent the device failure events. It could have been possible to feed
this model directly into an evaluation tool in order to compute the dependability measures. However weSensors 2012, 12 825
choose to reduce this tree to a minimal one. The goal is to obtain a less complex fault tree in order to
enable a faster computation of the dependability measures. Therefore, we compute the minimal cut sets
of the fault tree and use this data to build a minimal fault tree.
The algorithm used to compute the minimal cut sets is similar to the one proposed in [47]. The
major difference is that in the original proposal the authors consider reliable devices and unreliable
links, whereas in our proposal we consider the opposite (i.e., unreliable devices and reliable links). An
inversion technique to generate the minimal cut sets from the minimal path sets (MPS) was proposed
in [48]. A MPS represents a set of components such that, if all components are properly working then
the system is operational. However, if a component of the MPS fails, then the system also fails. It
was proved in [48] that the application of DeMorgan’s law to an appropriate boolean polynomial of the
minimal path set is related to a boolean polynomial of the minimal cut set. An efﬁcient algorithm for
path inversion was extended in [47] based on the procedure proposed in [48].
To clarify the minimal cut set generation, consider the following example that assumes the topology
described in Figure 10. In this scenario, the ﬁeld device Fd2 is the source whereas the gateway is the
sink. Li indicates if a link between two network devices is operational, whereas Li indicates the link is
down. Based on [47], the minimal path set for this example is described by Equation (12).
L1L4 + L2L5 + L2L3L4 + L1L3L5 (12)
Figure 10. Topology used to exemplify the minimal cut set generation.
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As described in [48], applying the DeMorgan’s laws to the Equation (12) we can ﬁnd a boolean
polynomial related to the minimal cut set according to Equation (13). By applying the distributive law
((A + B)C = AC + BC) and the absorption law (A + AB = A) to Equation (13), we obtain the result
presented in Equation (14). In other words, the communication between Fd2 and the gateway is broken
if either the links L1 and L2 fail or if the links L1, L3 and L5 fail or if the links L2, L3 and L4 fail or if
the links L4 and L5 fail.
(L1 + L4)(L2 + L5)(L2 + L3 + L4)(L1 + L3 + L5) (13)
L1L2 + L1L3L5 + L2L3L4 + L4L5 (14)
On the other hand, if we assume unreliable devices and reliable links the minimal path sets of
Figure 10 would be different from the represented in Equation (13). In this case, the minimal path setsSensors 2012, 12 826
are described by Equation (15). In the same way, if we apply the DeMorgan’s law and use the distributive
and the absorption laws, the minimal cut sets for the example of Figure 10 can be obtained according to
Equation (16). In other words, the communication between Fd2 and the gateway is interrupted if either
the gateway fails or if Fd2 fails or if Fd0 and Fd1 fail.
Fd2Fd0Gtw + Fd2Fd1Gtw + Fd2Fd0Fd1Gtw + Fd2Fd1Fd0Gtw (15)
Gtw + Fd2 + Fd0 Fd1 (16)
5.8. SHARPE Source Code Generation
After computing the minimal cut sets it becomes possible to generate a minimal fault tree that
represents the network failure process. As discussed previously, we choose to proceed in this way
to enable faster computations, but also due to the fact that the SHARPE tool does not accept models
expressed as cut sets, but accept models described as fault trees.
In this minimal fault tree the TOP event results from two events. The ﬁrst one is related to the failure
of the gateway, whereas the second one is related to the network failure condition that is application
dependent. The top events are described in Figure 11. Note that event nfc is based on the Figures 6
and 7 (Sections 5.4 and 5.6).
Figure 11. Events that conduct to a network failure.
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For the sake of understanding of the TOP event deﬁnition, consider the example represented in
Figure 10. We assume that the failure condition is deﬁned as the following: Fd0 + Fd1  Fd2. In other
words, the network fails if the device Fd0 fails or if devices Fd1 and Fd2 fail. We also assume that all
devices are conﬁgured without redundancy. The ﬁrst step is to ﬁnd the device failure condition (fc Fdi)
for each device present in the network failure condition. In this case, fc Fd0 = Fd0 a, fc Fd1 = Fd1 a
and fc Fd2 = Fd2 a + Fd0 a  Fd1 a. The TOP event for this example is presented in Figure 12.
The following step is to transform the generated fault tree into an input ﬁle for the SHARPE tool. The
source code exported to the SHARPE is simple and intuitively understandable. The procedure includes:
(a) deﬁne constants, functions and events; (b) decide if an event is basic or repeated; (c) eliminate
inconsistencies; (d) build the fault tree and deﬁne the measures to be computed.Sensors 2012, 12 827
Figure 12. TOP event deﬁnition for the example of Figure 10, when the network failure
condition is conﬁgured for Fd0 + Fd1  Fd2.
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The functions used in the source code are related to failure and repair CDFs associated with each ﬁeld
device. If we intend to evaluate the network reliability R(t) then it is only necessary to replace each event
related with the failure of device i by the respective CDF (as described in Section 4.3), since SHARPE
computes the device reliability Ri(t) from that. However, if we are interested in evaluating the network
availability A(t) then the process is slightly different. If failure and repair rates are constant (i.e., deﬁned
by an exponential distribution) then we can use these parameters to compute the availability function of
the device Ai(t) as described in Section 4.3. Then, it is only necessary to replace each event related with
the device i by its availability function Ai(t) (note: SHARPE has already a function that computes this
function from the rates). When other CDFs are used to characterize the failure and repair processes (or
at least one of them) it is necessary to use the concept of model hierarchy provided by SHARPE. The
reasoning behind this concept is to use the output of one model as the input of another model. Applied
to this case, we can model the behavior of device as a semi-Markov chain with two states: operational
and failed. In the former case the device is operational, and in the latter it is failed. Transitions between
these two states are described by failure and repair CDFs. As discussed in Section 5.2, these functions
must be expressed using exponential polynomial terms. This model can be solved by SHARPE and the
respective availability (i.e., operational state probability) can be used as the input event of the device
in the fault tree. Note that it is not necessary to solve this model in advance. The model’s code can be
placed in the same code that describes the fault tree, since SHARPE analyzes the dependencies between
models before computing the results. Details about the use of hierarchical models can be found in [49].
If a device is redundant, sub-events are created according to Figure 7(a); otherwise sub-events are
created according to Figure 7(b). An important aspect is to decide if an event is basic or repeated. ThisSensors 2012, 12 828
aspect is easily analyzed through a search in the basic events of the fault tree. If an event occurs only
once, it is considered to be basic; otherwise it is considered to be repeated.
The creation of the fault tree is completely based on discussions presented in Sections 5.4, 5.6 and 5.8.
A few precautions should be taken in cases where the logic gates have only one input. This is solved
by replacing the logic gate by the input event. Finally, the choice of evaluation function (reliability,
unreliability, MTTF, availability, unavailability) or the importance measures (Birnbaum or criticality) is
inserted in the source code.
An example of generated SHARPE source code is presented in Figure 13. This example is based on
the fault tree of Figure 12 and assumes that device i failure and repair rates are constant, respectively
i and i. Note that there are two repeated events, Fd0 a and Fd1 a. In this example the unavailability
function (inst unavail()) was used for the sake of illustration of the functions supported by SHARPE.
The notation adopted in the source code used to build the fault tree is identical to Figure 12.
Figure 13. SHARPE source code generated by the proposed methodology and based on the
fault tree of Figure 12.
ftree FaultTreeModel
basic Gtw0 inst unavail(Gtw0;Gtw0)
repeat Fd0 a inst unavail(Fd0;Fd0)
repeat Fd1 a inst unavail(Fd1;Fd1)
basic Fd2 a inst unavail(Fd2;Fd2)
and cp Fd2 and0 Fd0 a Fd1 a
or fc Fd2 Fd2 a cp Fd2 and0
and nfc and0 Fd1 a fc Fd2
or or nfc nfc and0 Fd0 a
or Failure Gtw0 or nfc
end
6. Results
In this section we will present some results obtained when using the proposed methodology to
evaluate some dependability metrics in WSN. Our main goal is to highlight some of the capabilities
of the proposed methodology, regarding the identiﬁcation of dependability bottlenecks in WSN, and the
capability to evaluate reliability and availability in typical industrial application scenarios. The main
assumptions considered in this section are listed below:
 Scenarios: we have used line, star and cluster (particular case of mesh topology) topologies.
 Failure rate: we assume that device failures occur with a constant rate (i.e., exponential
distribution). The gateway and the access point have typically a reliability higher than other
network devices. Thus, the gateway and the access point have been conﬁgured to have a failureSensors 2012, 12 829
rate with one order of magnitude lower than the ﬁeld devices and routers. The failure rate of the
devices is unknown, however we can use different range of values to measure different behaviors.
We assume a MTTF (hours) range to 1 year (  = 1e–4), 5 years (  = 2e–5) and 10 years
(  = 1e–5).
 Repair rate: similarly, we assume a constant repair rate. Although this could be an unrealistic
assumption, it can be proved that this approximation results in small errors if    (which is the
case). We assume different range of values for the gateways and access points, when compared
with the ﬁeld devices and routers. The MTTR range for the ﬁrst two devices was conﬁgured
to 5 h ( = 0.2) and 10 h ( = 0.1), whereas the MTTR range for the other devices was conﬁgured
to 1 day (  = 0.04) and 2 days (  = 0.02).
6.1. Star Topology
The ﬁrst assessed scenario was the star topology. Consider an application that is monitoring the
temperature of four boilers. A sensor node is installed in each boiler as described in Figure 14. Within
this context, it is assumed that the application fails if at least one ﬁeld device fails.
Figure 14. A star topology composed of four ﬁeld devices.
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Figure 15. Reliability evaluation for a star topology.
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It is intuitive to realize that the network reliability will increase as long as more reliable devices are
used. This behavior is shown in Figure 15. If there is no redundancy, the scenario that uses sensor
nodes with failure rate of 1E–4 (MTTF—1 year) presents a network reliability lower than all the other
scenarios using more reliable ﬁeld devices.
In what concerns dependability requirements, design decisions are usually related to the selection of
more reliable and more expensive devices vs. less reliable and inexpensive devices. In general, there
is a global policy whose goal is to improve the reliability of the applications. The result presented in
Figure 15 can be used for that purpose.
On the other hand, in some cases the application requires an increase of the network reliability, but
the acquisition of more robust devices is not an option. A possible solution for this problem is the use of
redundancy. For instance, consider the topology described in Figure 14, composed of sensor nodes with
failure rate 1E–4. Depending on the number of spare devices that can be used, the network reliability
can reach levels comparable with those achieved when more reliable devices are used. According to the
results shown in Figure 15, when just one spare device is used (1r) in each ﬁeld device, during 2000 h
the WSN achieves reliability levels comparable to the case where ﬁeld devices ﬁve times more reliable
are used. If two spare devices are used (2r) in each ﬁeld device, the network reliability during 3500 h
presents levels comparable with a scenario where devices ten times more reliable are used. On the other
hand, during 6000 h the network reliability has a performance level that is comparable to the case where
devices ﬁve times more reliable have been used. This result is three times better than the result found
when using just single redundancy (1r).
Another way to evaluate the inﬂuence of redundancy is through a MTTF analysis, which is dependent
on the network failure conditions. We assume four types of failure conditions: case I, at least one ﬁeld
device fails; case II, at least two ﬁeld devices fail; case III, at least three ﬁeld devices fail; case IV, all ﬁeld
devices fail. The results are summarized in Figure 16. For example, if it is considered that the network
fails if at least one ﬁeld device fails, then the use of single redundancy (1r) may increase the network
MTTF by 125%, whereas the double redundancy (2r) may increase it by 220%. This MTTF-based
analysis can be useful to ﬁnd the desired application requirements.
Figure 16. Inﬂuence of failure conditions and redundancy levels to the network MTTF.
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6.2. Line Topology
Line topology is a typical solution used for monitoring pipeline applications. In this case, the
information is relayed hop-by-hop until the gateway. Figure 17 illustrates an example of a line topology
for a WSN. If a device along the line fails, the monitoring application will also fail.
Figure 17. Typical line topology for a WSN.
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These impairments can be identiﬁed through the use of Birnbaum’s measure and criticality importance.
A component importance analysis for this scenario is illustrated in Figures 18 and 19. Based on the
Birnbaum’s measure (Figure 18), the ﬁeld device Fd1 is the device more susceptible to cause a network
failure. This behavior is conﬁrmed by the criticality importance, as illustrated in Figure 19. In other
words, if the ﬁeld device Fd1 fails, there is a high probability that there is no path to the gateway due to
a failure in an intermediate device.
Figure 18. Analysis of the component importance based on Birnbaum measure for the line
topology.
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Consider a communication scenario where the application requires an improved reliability level
and there is just one available spare device. The problem that must be addressed is to select which
device should be equipped with the available spare device, so that the reliability level of the system
is maximized. A sensitivity analysis for this problem is shown in Table 1. According to the resultsSensors 2012, 12 832
presented, if the spare device is conﬁgured to be at the gateway or access point, the MTTF of network
will be increased by around 2%. Thus, there is no real advantage to conﬁgure two spare devices in
the gateway or in the access points. The best result, as expected, is attained when the spare device is
conﬁgured to be at device Fd1. In this conﬁguration, the network MTTF is increased by 19.23%. This
conﬁguration presents even better performance than the conﬁguration with two spare devices in Fd3 or
Fd4. Note that if the spare device have been conﬁgured in Fd4, the network MTTF would have been
decreased by 1.95%.
Figure 19. Analysis of the component importance based on Criticality measure for the
line topology.
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Table 1. Sensitivity analysis.
Device
Increase in MTTF
1 spare device 2 spare devices
Gtw 2:32% 2:43%
AP 1:98% 2:40%
Fd4  1:95% 14:05%
Fd3 3:60% 17:19%
Fd2 10:44% 20:90%
Fd1 19:23% 25:43%
6.3. Cluster Topology
In general, a cluster topology is used when there is the need to segregate partially a network. Each
cluster may assume speciﬁc tasks, for example, monitoring a region, trafﬁc prioritization, provide
redundancy, etc. Figure 20 illustrates a typical cluster topology for a WSN, where the clusters
communicate each other through router devices.Sensors 2012, 12 833
Figure 20. Typical cluster topology for a Wireless Sensor Network.
Gtw
AP
Router Field device
Consider for example an application where each cluster monitors an industrial control loop. The
application will fail if at least one of the cluster fails. On the other hand, a cluster will fail if all ﬁeld
devices within the cluster fail. The dependability target is to maximize the availability of the application
and consequently to minimize the application outage (measured in hours per year).
We have analyzed the inﬂuence upon the network unavailability of maintenance operations. The
results of this analysis are illustrated in Figure 21. It can be observed that changes in the repair rate
of the gateway or the access point do not cause signiﬁcant changes in the network unavailability. On
the other hand, the repair rates of the ﬁeld devices and the routers have strong inﬂuence on the network
unavailability. If, for example, the repair rate of one these devices is doubled, the application outage is
decreased by around 50% (131 hours per year to 66 hours per year).
Figure 21. Inﬂuence of the maintenance of devices in the network unavailability.
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According to the results presented in Figure 20, a critical device is the head of cluster. This function is
executed by a router device. Assuming that there are two spare router devices available, the bottleneck ofSensors 2012, 12 834
cluster can be minimized in two different ways: conﬁguring a structural redundancy (scenario illustrated
in Figure 20) for two router devices where each one receives a spare, or conﬁguring the two spare
devices as new router devices in the network as illustrated in Figure 22. The results from this analysis
are presented in Table 2. In the ﬁrst case, when redundancy has been used, the application outage time
was around tree times more efﬁcient than the scenario presented in Figure 20 (gtw, AP = 0:2 and
router, field device = 0:02). On the other hand, the use of two new routers can signiﬁcantly decrease
the application outage by around 65 times. This result is due to the creation of new paths to the gateway,
when new router devices are added to the network.
Figure 22. Adding router devices to improve reliability and availability.
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Table 2. Means to improve the availability of network.
Scenario Unavailability Outage (hours per year)
Normal 0:015 131
Repair 2 more fast 0:007 66
Redundancy 0:005 44
2 new routers 0:00025 2
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a methodology to evaluate the dependability of Wireless Sensor
Networks in typical industrial environments. For this purpose, we have modeled a WSN using a fault
tree-based formalism, considering permanent faults that occur in ﬁeld devices due to hardware problems
and the absence of routes to the gateway.
To validate the proposed methodology, we select several scenarios commonly found in industrial
applications. The results obtained show that the proposal is useful to identify dependability bottlenecks,
to estimate the required redundancy level and to aid the design throughout the life cycle of the network.Sensors 2012, 12 835
In future works we intend to support unreliable link, thus considering transient failures. Furthermore
we also intend to consider the coverage factor related with the reconﬁguration mechanisms, and also
common-cause failures.
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